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[erim. No. 10897. In B~k. Sept. 21, 1967.] 
In re JOSEPH GRIFFIN on Habeas Corpus. 
343 
[la, Ib] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Probation-
Dura.tion of Authority to Modify or Revoke-After a proba-
tionary period has expired, the court does not lose jurisdiction 
of the subject matter, but it exceeds its jurisdiction under 
Pen. Code, § 1203.3, if it then revokes or modifies its order 
suspending the imposition or execution of sentence and admit-
ing the defendant to probation. 
[2] ld.-Judgment and Sentence-Probation-Review-Habeas 
Corpus.-Habeas corpus lies to review and correct court action 
in excess of its jurisdiction under Pen. Code, § 1203.3, govern-
ing revocation, modification and termination of a defendant's 
probation and his discharge. 
[3] Courts-Jurisdietion-Aequisition-Estoppel.-The rule that 
jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel relates to subject 
matter jurisdiction, namely, the court's power to hear and 
determine the cause. 
r 4] ld.-Jurisdietion-Acquisition-Estoppel.-When a court has 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, a party who seeks or con-
sents to action beyond the court's power as defined by statute 
or decisional rule may be estopped to complain of the ensuing 
action in excess of jurisdiction, the determination of such 
estoppel depending on the importance of the irregularity not 
only to the parties but to the functioning of the courts and in 
some instances on other considerations of public policy. 
[6] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Probation-Duration 
of Authority to Modify or Revoke: Estoppel - Excess of 
Jurisdiction.-A trial court's determination that a probationer 
was estopped to deny the court's jurisdiction in revoking 
probation and sentencing him to prison was in harmony with 
the proper operation of the probation system, and such 
estoppel was not precluded by any substantive or procedural 
policy, where, although the revocation was made after his 
probation period had elapsed, the probationer had himself 
invited the excess of jurisdiction by seeking and obtaining a 
continuance to obtain private counsel, the continuance itself 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 82; Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 95. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 363; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, 
§ 567. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 997; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 998(6); [3, 4] Courts, § 66; [5] Criminal Law, § 997; 
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being granted before the expiration of the probationary 
period, when the court could properly have ordered immediate 
revocation, regardless of counsel, and continued merely the 
determination on the alternatives of reinstatement of proba-
tion or imposition of sentence. 
[6] Id. - Judgment and Sentence - Time to Pronounce - Revoca-
tion of ·Probation. - When imposition of sentence has been 
suspended, judgment can be pronounced at any time after the 
timely revocation of probation. 
PROCEEDING in habeaa corpus to secure release from 
custody. Order to show cause discharged, writ denied. 
Charles L. Lippitt and Jerome S. Billett for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas S. Kerrigan, Deputy 
Attorney· General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was cllarged with four counts 
of grand theft and five of forgery. He pleaded guilty to count 
3 (grand theft) and count 9 (forgery). On July 23, 1963, th, 
superior court suspended imposition of sentence on these 
counts, dismissed the other charges, and granted petitioner 
probation for the term of three years. 
The probation report showed that in his work as an insur-
ance adjuster petitioner obtained approximately $20,000 by 
thefts and forgeries. He attributed his criminal activities to a 
need for money that arose from a compulsion to gamble. The 
conditions of probation were that he spend the first six 
months of the three-year term in the county jail, that he make 
restitution through the probatio,n officer in amounts and 
manner to be prescribed by that officer, and that he not 
gamble. After petitioner had been in jail for three months the 
court modified the probation order to permit his immediate 
release because he represented that he would be able to obtain 
employment and begin restitution. Petitioner agreed with the 
probation officer that beginning in February 1964 he would 
make payments to that officer of about $100 a month toward 
restitution. -
Petitioner did not make these payments as agreed. On July 
7, 1964, he appeared with counsel for a hearing on the proba-
tion officer's report of violations. The court modified the 
probation order to require petitioner to pay $125 a month to 
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make these payments. He issued bad checks and engaged in 
illegal schemes similar to those resulting in the original crimi-
nal charges. On August 23, 1965, he again appeared with 
counsel for a hearing as to his violations of the conditions of 
probation. The court ordered probation continued with the 
additional condition that petitioner sign no checks. 
Petitioner continued to violate the conditions of probation. 
On JUly 5, 1966, he appeared without counsel for a hearing as 
to revocation of probation. This appearance and the ensuing 
proceedings were before a judge who had not previously 
heard the case. Through the public defender petitioner moved 
for a month's continuance to obtain private counsel. The 
court continued the matter to August 2, 1966. No one men-
tioned that the period of probation would expire on July 
22. 
On August 2 petitioner appeared with counsel who was new 
to the case. Petitioner's counsel and the deputy district attor-
ney argued the merits of the probation officer's recommenda-
tion that probation be revoked. No one mentioned that the 
three-year term of probation had expired. The court ordered 
probation revoked. The judge stated that he would sentence 
petitioner to the state prison, but at petitioner's request he 
continued the matter one week. . 
After the hearing on August 2, petitioner called his coun-
sel's attention to the expiration of the probationary term. 
Counsel had not known that the term had expired. He 
promptly served and filed a memorandum contending that 
upon the expiration of the probationary period the court lost 
jurisdiction to revoke probation. After further hearings the 
court determined that on July 5, when petitioner requested a 
month's continuance, he knew that the probationary term 
would end on July 23, and that by knowingly seeking and 
obtaining the continuance beyond the termination date he 
waived his right to insist on the jurisdictional nature of 
timely revocation of probation. On August 16, 1966, the court 
sentenced petitioner to the state prison on counts 5 and 9. 1 
Although the order revoking probation could have been 
reviewed on an appeal from the ensuing judgment (People v. 
Robinson (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 143, 145 [271 P.2d 872]), peti-
IThe imposition of sentence on count 5 was an obvious clerical error, 
for petitioner had pleaded guilty to eounts 3 and 9 and the other counts 
had been dismissed. The superior court can correct the error on its own 
motion. (Bogart v. Superior Court (1964) 230 Ca1.App.2d 874, 875 [41 
Ca1.Rptr.480].) 
C) 
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tioner did not appeal. Instead, after having applied 
unsucc('ssfully for habeas corpus in the courts below, he now 
seeks the writ in this court. 
Penal Code section 1203.32 provides that the court shall 
have authority to revoke or modify probation "at any time 
during the' term of probation." [1&] The cases have 
consistently taken the view announced in People v. O'DonneU 
(1918) 37 Cal.App. 192, 196-197 [174 P. 102], that "the stat-
ute itself furnishes the measure of the power which may thus 
be exercised" and "the court loses jurisdiction or power to 
make an order revoking or modifying the order suspending 
the imposition of sentence or the execution thereof and 
admitting the defendant to probation after the probationary 
period has expired." (See People v. WiUiams (1944) 24 
Ca1.2d 848, 854 [151 P.2d 244] ; People v. Siegel (1965) 235 
Cal.App.2d 522, 524 [45 Cal.Rptr. 530]; People v. Jordan 
(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 7, 11 [37 Cal.Rptr. 738]; People v. 
Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 182, 191 [7 Cal.Rptr. 525]; 
People v. Blume (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 474, 481-482 [7 
Cal.Rptr. 16]; People v. Blaketnan (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 
596, 599 [339 P.2d 202] ; People v. Brown (1952) 111 Cal. 
App.2d 406, 408 [244 P.2d 702].) [2] Habeas corpus lies to 
review and correct action in excess of the jurisdiction defined 
by section 1203.3. (In f'e Olark (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 838,840 [337 
P.2d 67] ; Ex parte Slattery (1912) 163 Cal. 176, 178 [124 P. 
856] ; see Fayad v. Superior Oourt (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 79, 
82 [313 P.2d 669] [mandate directing the superior court to 
discharge petitioner from a probationary term that had been 
extended beyond the statutory maximum].) 
[3] Petitioner contends that because timely revocation of 
probation is " jurisdictional" the rule that jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred by estoppel applies. That rule relates to 
subject matter jurisdiction, the court's power to hear and 
determine the cause. (Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 59 
Cal.2d 295, 298 [347 P.2d 668] ; In re Johannes (1931) 213 
Cal. 125, 131 [1 P.2d 984] ; In re Garrity (1929) 97 Cal.App. 
372, 376 [275 P. 480] ; People v. Titus (1927) 85 Cal.App. 
2Section 1203.3: ' 'The court shall have authority at any time during 
the term of probation to revoke, modify, or cbange its order of suspen-
sion of imposition or execution of sentence. • . • [I]n all cases, if the 
court bas not seen fit to revoke the order of probation and impose sen-
tence or pronoun('e judgment, the dcfend:mt shall at the end of the term 
of probation or any extenbion thereof, be by the court discharged subject 
to the provisions of these sections." 
The discharge of the defendant referred to in section 1203.3 is pro- \ 
vided for in section 1203.4, quoted infra, fn. 3. 
) 
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413, 416 [259 P. 465] ; see People v. Granice (1875) 50 Cal. 
447,448-449; 13 Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 82.) 
[Ib] The jurisdictional concept involved in the cases 
holding that the court is without power to revoke probation 
after the end of the probationary term is not lack of jurisdic-
tion of the cause but excess of jurisdiction. (See the discus-
sion in Ex parte Slattery (1912) supra, 163 Cal. 176, 178, anti 
People v. O'Donnell (1918) supra, 37 Cal. App. 192, 196-197.) 
Neither the probation statutes nor the cases applying them 
support a holding that expiration of the probationary period 
terminates the court's jurisdiction of the subject matter. The 
statutes themselves contemplate that such fundamental juris-
diction continues, for they provide for the court's determina-
tion of certain matters after the end of the probationary 
term.3 
[4] When, as here, the court has jurisdiction of the 
subject, a party who seeks or consents to action beyond the 
court's power as defined by statute or decisional rule may be 
estopped to complain of the ensuing action in excess of juris-
diction. (City of Los Angel.es v. Cole (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 509, 
515 [170 P.2d 928]; Guardianship of Di Carlo (1935) 3 
Ca1.2d 225, 228-229 [44 P.2d 562, 99 A;L.R. 990] ; People v. 
Patrick (1897) 118 Cal. 332, 333 [50 P. 425]; Hoshollr v. 
County of Contra Costa (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 602, 605 [21 
Cal.Rptr. 714] ; Phillips v. Beilsten (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 
SPenal Code section 1203.4 provides that "Every defendant who has 
fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof, or 
who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the termination 
of the period thereof, shall at any time thereafter be permitted by the 
court to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; or if 
he has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set aside 
the verdict of guilty j and in either case the court shall thereupon dismiss 
the accusations or infomlation against such defendant, who shall there-
after be released from all penalties and disabilities [with some excep-
tions] resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been con-
victed. " 
On application of a defendant who meets the requirements of section 
1203.4 the court not only can. but must proceed in accord with that 
statute. (People v. Bradley (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 887, 889 [57 Cal. 
Rptr. 82]; People v. Johnson (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 140, 144 [285 P.2d 
74]; see Ex parte Slattery (1912) BUpra, 163 Cal. 176.) 
Penal Code section 17 provides, "Where a court grants probation to 
a defendant without imposition of sentence upon conviction of a crime 
punishable in the discretion of the court by imprisonment in the state 
prison or imprisonment in the county jail, the court may at the time of 
granting probation, or, on application of defendant or probation officer 
thereafter, declare the offense to be a misdemeanor." The court's power 
and duty to pass on such an application for reduction of the offense to 
a misdemeanor continues after the end of the probationary term. (Meyer 
v. Superior Co-urt (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 133, 139 [55 Cal.Rptr. 350].) 
...• :) 
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450, 457 [330 P.2d 912] ; Munns v. Stenman (1957) 152 Cal. 
App.2d 543, 557-558 [314 P.2d 67] ; Blue v. Superior Co-urt 
(1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 278, 285 [305 P.2d 209]; see 30A 
Am.Jur., Judgments, § 47; 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 108, 109.) 
Whether he shall be estopped depends on the importance of 
the irregularity not only to the parties but to the functioning 
of the courts and in some instances on other considerations of 
public policy. A litigant who has stipulated to a procedure in 
excess of jurisdiction may be estopped to question it when 
"To hold otherwise would permit the parties to trifle with the 
courts." (City of Los Angeles v. Cole (1946) supra, 28 
Cal.2d 509, 515.) On the other hand waiver of procedural 
requirements may not be permitted when the allowance of a 
deviation would lead to confusion in the processing of other 
cases by other litigants. (Tabor v. Superior Court 0946) 28 
Cal.2d 505, 508-509 [170 P .2d 667].) Substantive rules based 
on public policy sometimes control the allowance or disallow-
ance of estoppel. For example, People v. Blakeman (1959) 
supra, 170 Cal.App.2d 596, 598, held that a defendant who 
requested and received probation conditioned on banishment 
was not estopped to attack the condition, for public policy 
forbids banishment and "The law cannot suffer the state's. 
interest· a~d concern in the observance and enforcement of· 
this policy to be thwarted through the guise of waiver of a 
personal right by an individual." On the other hand a party 
who has procured a divorce decree is estopped to claim later 
that it is invalid. In that situation a rule of substantive law 
based on public policy prevents his questioning even the juris-
dictional fact of domicile. (Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 
Cal.2d 210, 218-221 [317 P.2d 613]; Rediker v. Rediker 
(1950) 35 Ca1.2d 796,805-808 [221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152] ; 
Union Bank ({1 Trust Co. v. Gordon (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 
681,685 [254 P.2d 644].) 
[5] In the present case no policy, substantive or proce-
dural precludes estoppel of petitioner to attack the excess of 
jurisdiction that resulted from the granting of his motion for 
a continuance. The trial court's determination that he is 
estopped is in harmony with the proper operation of the 
proba tion system. 
By seeking a continuance to a time beyond the end of the 
probationary term petitioner asked the court to do in a manner 
that was in excess of jurisdiction what it could have done 
properly by immediately revoking probation and continuing 
the matter for a hearing and determination as to the alterna-
) 
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tives of reinstatement of probation or imposition of sentence. 
The court could have revoked probation without affording 
petitioner the opportunity to obtain counsel; indeed it could 
have made the order of revocation ex parte. (In re Levi 
(1952) 39 Cal.2d 41, 44 [244 P.2d 403] ; In re Davis (1951) 
37 Ca1.2d 872, 874-875 [236 P.2d 579].) [6] It could then 
have continued the matter to a suitable time for hearing, for 
when imposition of sentence has been suspended judgment can 
be pronounced at any time after the timely revocation of 
probation. (People v. Williams (1944) supra, 24 Cal.2d 848, 
854.) Before the pronouncement of judgment petitioner could 
have moved the court to set aside its order revoking probation 
and to place him on probation again (Pen. Code, § 1203.2.) 
These procedures would have proteGted both petititioner's 
right to counsel on arraignment for judgment (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 13 ; In re Perez (1966) 65 Cal.2d 224, 229 [53 Cal. 
Rptr.414, 418 P.2d 6]) and the court's jurisdiction. 
Petitioner invokes the rule of certain civil cases that the 
defendant is entitled to a dismissal even though his own 
conduct caused the plaintiff's failure to proceed within the 
time prescribed by sections 581a and 583 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. (E.g., Miller &7 Lux Inc. v. Super·ior Court (1923) 
192 Cal. 333, 339-340 [219 P. 1006] ; Siskiyou County Bank v. 
Hoyt (1901) 132 Cal. 81, 84 [64 P. 118].) On the other hand 
it has been suggested that we might find support for the trial 
court's determination in cases applying the doctrine of 
waiver against a defendant who seeks or does not object to a 
continuance beyond the time periods prescribed for criminal 
cases by section 1382 of the Penal Code. (E.g,. People v. 
Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 145-154 [32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 
P.2d 452].) None of the civil or criminal dismissal statutes is 
significantly similar to the probation statutes. The civil cases 
as to dismissal are not persuasive in support of petitioner nor 
are the criminal cases persuasive against him. What we have 
said as to the operation of the probation system shows that 
application of estoppel here is appropriate under the statutes 
dealing with that subject. 
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
, ' 
For these many reasons it is obvious that a corporate bond 
complies with the statutory requirements and that the 
peremptory writ should issue. 
The parties have neither raised nor briefed the question 
whether mandate is an appropriate remedy since petitioner 
could have ha'd a judgment of dismissal entered, and then' 
appealed. It is a debatable question whether the remedy by 
appeal would here be adequate. Moreover, the point at issue 
has been fully briefed and argued by the parties. If we were 
to compel the parties to proceed by way of appeal only delay 
and expense would be accomplished which would prejudice 
the courts and the parties (Shively v. Stewart, 65 Ca1.2d 475, 
481 [55 CalRptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65]; Hagan v. 8uperior 
Court, 53 Cal.2d i 498, 502 [2 Cal. Rptr. 288, 348 P.2d 896]). 
Under such circumstances the writ should issue. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue ordering the 
respondent court to accept the corporate bond proifered, and ' 
to take such other steps as the proceedings require. . 
Traynor, C. ~., McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., .Burke, 
J., and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
